

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 9/2/83
TO: EXECUTIVE REGISTRY		
ROOM NO. 7F-33	BUILDING HQS.	
REMARKS: L-117 NSDD-30		
FROM: C/IAD/CTB		
ROOM NO. 4C-20	BUILDING HQS.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
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9 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Chief, International Activities Division
Counterterrorism Group

SUBJECT: Terrorist Crisis Management Policy

1. General - In any discussion of crisis management policy and procedures during a serious terrorist incident, one essential point should be established, i.e. that it is CIA's role to provide or coordinate acquisition of intelligence and other related support to whichever agency or mechanism is charged with the management of a given incident. Under the current ground rules, CIA will provide its full support to the State Department as the lead agency for incidents abroad, or to the FBI as the lead agency in a domestic incident, or to whatever policy-level (NSC) mechanism which might be called upon to manage an especially serious incident.

2. Agenda Items

A. Rescind NSDD 30. A copy of NSDD 30 and terms of reference for the Terrorist Incident Working Group created therein are attached. If NSDD 30 is to be rescinded, what does DOD find objectionable therein? We know from having been present at various interagency fora over the past year that DOD is dissatisfied with State's performance as the lead agency in overseas terrorist incidents and in some instances we have also been frustrated with State's role. (It has been our policy, however, to stay out of these discussions over who should be in charge.) What does DOD propose as an alternate? Does DOD wish to abolish the lead agency rule altogether? If so, what does this mean? To convene the TIWG (or another group) in every incident, international or domestic, which is deemed important to U.S. interests? Who then would be in charge at a location abroad?

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S E C R E T

B. Political Level of Command and Control of Terrorist Incidents. There are two considerations here, command and control in the Washington, D.C. area and command and control in the field. The first is open to question and is probably at the heart of the issue being raised by the Secretary of Defense. The second seems to permit no leeway since, in the field, the position of the Ambassador as the President's personal representative to that country seems inviolate. The primacy of the Ambassador in the country to which he is appointed is traditional and has been reinforced by every administration since Kennedy. Therefore, "who's in charge" in Washington seems to be debatable. "Who's in charge" in the field should not be. In the latter area, we believe DOD may have in mind a variation of the British system which calls for the dispatch to the field of a senior official. We question the value of this proposal.

C. Alternatives to Reactive Counter-Terrorist Policy. We would take exception to the use of the word "reactive". In our approach to counterterrorism, the cornerstone is an aggressive intelligence collection effort to provide advance notice of terrorist plans, intentions and capabilities. We have not had the success we continue to strive for, but the approach of using intelligence to prevent terrorist incidents is correct and hardly merely "reactive". Nor should anti-terrorism measures (or target-hardening) to improve security at airports, borders, and key installation be viewed as reactive. Each of these areas requires (even demands) improvement, but we are convinced of the correctness of our approach.


If the inference is to building a strike force, composed of American or non-American nationals who would conduct interdiction operations against terrorist bases or training camps, there is the very relevant question of legal authority to do so.

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You may recall that this issue surfaced 8 - 10 months ago from elements in DOD. We thought at the time that briefings we provided had resolved the problem. We continue to feel that the issue arises out of ignorance. DOD simply does not know what the global network of intelligence and security services has accomplished. Numerous successes have been recorded, many in the past year. Perhaps a briefing for Secretary Weinberger would help to clarify this matter.

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3. Also attached is a letter from Mr. Noel Koch at Defense to Ambassador Sayre at State which outlines DOD problems with NSDD 30 in general and the "Lead Agency" concept in particular. We feel that DOD's argument against the Lead Agency concept is somewhat overdrawn. The creation of a viable alternative might well introduce similar problems.



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Attachments

1. NSDD 30
2. Outline for Terrorism Incident Working Group
3. Mr. Noel C. Koch's letter to Ambassador Robert Sayre

C/IAD/CTC



(9 February 1983)

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WASHINGTON

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April 10, 1982

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 30

MANAGING TERRORIST INCIDENTS

The United States is committed, as a matter of national policy, to oppose terrorism domestically and internationally. Efficient and effective management of terrorist incidents is crucial to this commitment. Successful management of terrorist incidents requires a rapid, effective response, immediate access to institutional expertise, and extensive prior planning. Because of these requirements, the management of terrorist incidents of duration will be handled in the following manner:

- (1) Responsibilities. If the gravity of a terrorist incident situation warrants, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at the direction of the Vice President, will convene the Special Situation Group (SSG) to advise the President with respect to decision options on appropriate policies and actions.
- (2) The Lead Agency. The coordination of federal response to terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with the most direct operational role in dealing with the particular terrorist incident at hand. It will coordinate all operational aspects of the incident, including press and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be:
 - The State Department, for international terrorist incidents that take place outside of US territory.
 - The Department of Justice for terrorist incidents which take place within US territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI will be the Lead Agency within the Department of Justice for operational response to such incidents.
 - The FAA for hijackings within the special jurisdiction of the United States.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency will be responsible for planning for and managing the public health aspects of a terrorist incident and recovery from the consequences of such incidents.

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Review on 10 April 1988

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will resolve any uncertainty on the designation of the Lead Agency or on agency responsibilities.

- (3) The Terrorist Incident Working Group. To support the Special Situation Group, a Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) will be established. This group will consist of representatives from State, the DCI, DOD, FBI, FEMA and the NSC staff, with augmentation from other agencies, as required. The TIWG will be activated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It will be chaired by a senior representative from the NSC staff.

The purpose of the TIWG is to provide the SSG with direct, operational support, to ensure interagency coordination, and to provide advice and recommendations during an incident. The Lead Agency will continue to manage the incident under the direction and coordination of the TIWG and the SSG.

- (4) The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, will be responsible for the development of overall US policy on terrorism, including, *inter alia*, policy directives, organizational issues, legislative initiatives, and interagency training programs.

- (5) White House Operations Group. The White House Operations Group, chaired by the Director of the White House Military Office, will have responsibility for issues relating to threats or acts of terrorism directed against the President or the Vice President or senior US officials and protectees as directed by the President. The NSC staff will effect liaison between this group and the IG/T and TIWG.

- (6) The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, chaired by the DCI, will provide intelligence support to the SSG and the TIWG. It will focus and coordinate interagency intelligence efforts to counter terrorist threats. In anticipation of terrorist incidents, the Committee will concentrate on threat alerts, trend assessments, and required procedural improvements, such as more rapid dissemination of critical information.

- (7) Planning and Exercises. In order to ensure effective management of terrorism incidents, prior planning and exercise activity are essential. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism will be the primary mechanism within the US Government for planning and policy recommendations. To ensure the development of an effective, coordinated interagency exercise program, the Chairman of the IG/T

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will appoint an Exercise Committee which will coordinate the development of a multi-year exercise program and review all multiple agency counterterrorism exercises. This committee will assure that the government's counterterrorism capabilities are maintained in a high state of readiness and that duplication of exercises is avoided. No multiple agency exercise at the national level may be held without the recommendation of the IG/T and the approval of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

This National Security Decision Directive supersedes all previous inconsistent directives and instructions on managing terrorism incidents.

Ronald Reagan

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Terrorism Incident Working Group

Terms of Reference

I. Purpose: The Terrorism Incident Working Group (TIWG) will be convened to support the Special Situation Group (SSG) when the latter is called upon to supervise the resolution of a major terrorism incident.

II. Functions: The TIWG will:

- Provide the SSG with direct operational support. The TIWG will be directly responsible to the SSG for all matters relating to the terrorism incident. The TIWG will be responsive to the taskings of the SSG and will be the medium by which the SSG tasks the government. The TIWG will have the authority to take decisions in the name of the SSG for those matters not requiring SSG consideration. The TIWG will ensure that the necessary papers are prepared for SSG consideration. The TIWG will be responsible for the preparation and dissemination of formal SSG decisions and for monitoring their implementation.
- Ensure interagency coordination. The TIWG will effect coordination among all the agencies involved in the management of a major terrorism incident. The TIWG will have the authority to task the relevant agencies for support and will clear requests from one agency asking for support from another. The TIWG will also ensure that information is made available to all involved agencies. In this regard, the TIWG will receive intelligence input from the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and will ensure that all agencies are kept fully informed.
- Provide advice and recommendations to the SSG and the President. The TIWG will coordinate and transmit recommendations on courses of action to the SSG and, if so directed, to the President. The TIWG will direct the preparation of specific options which include all instruments at the disposal of the President. The TIWG will collate, coordinate, and analyze alternative courses of action, will take decisions when appropriate, and will forward options to the SSG when necessary.

To ensure that these functions can be carried out, the TIWG will develop and constantly update a set of procedures to be followed in the event of a major terrorism incident.

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Membership: The TIWG will be composed depending on the nature of the incident.

- For pre-crisis planning, the TIWG will consist of representation from the Office of the Vice President; the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Transportation, Defense and Energy; the DCI, the JCS, the FBI, and FEMA.
- For actual incidents, the TIWG will consist of subsets of the pre-crisis TIWG, according to the nature of the incident. Should the nature of the incident change, additional personnel may be included in the TIWG.

Under both conditions, the TIWG will be chaired by the National Security Council staff.

It is important that each agency identify one individual and an alternate to be available for service with the TIWG.

IV. Duration:

- Pre-crisis: The TIWG will meet periodically at the call of the chairman to review procedures and other relevant issues in order to ensure maximum effectiveness in time of crisis.
- During a major incident: The TIWG will be convened by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs when appropriate and will not be dissolved for the duration of the incident. It is up to the TIWG chairman, in coordination with the SSG, to determine when and how often the TIWG will meet during an incident.

V. Location: The TIWG will meet in the White House complex. Logistic support for the TIWG will be the responsibility of the National Security Council staff.

VI. Relationships:

- TIWG - IG/T. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) is responsible for the development of overall US policy on terrorism. Its functions are primarily executed in a non-crisis environment. The TIWG, on the other hand, is focused primarily upon crisis situations. The TIWG will provide input to the IG/T on policy issues affecting incident management. The IG/T will keep the TIWG informed on policy decisions, regulations, and exercises which affect the management of terrorism incidents. It is highly probable and desirable that designated members of the TIWG may also sit on the IG/T. The chairman of the TIWG will provide liaison between the White House and the IG/T.

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Large number of terrorism incidents
will not require the activation of the SSG or the TIWG. These incidents will be managed by the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will keep the chairman of the TIWG fully informed so that if the incident escalates and the TIWG is activated, there will be no loss of continuity.

In those incidents in which the SSG and TIWG are activated, the Lead Agency will be subordinate to the SSG through the TIWG. The Lead Agency will be responsible for developing options, for determining requirements, and for the operational management of the terrorism incident. For those decisions requiring interagency coordination or SSG consideration, the Lead Agency will provide recommendations and options to the TIWG.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

18 May 1982

Ambassador Robert Sayre
M/CT, Room 2238
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Bob,

(S) I know your comment Wednesday last about Defense coveting the Lead Agency role in counter-terrorism was made in jest, but there are sufficient differences of opinion on the matter of the Lead Agency that I thought it would be useful to clarify our position. Further to the point, I know neither of us want differences of opinion, sometimes expressed heatedly, to affect personal relationships.

(S) DoD's concern is not which should be the Lead Agency, but rather with the Lead Agency concept itself. Parenthetically I want to say that I do not concede that having the concept codified in an NSDD validates it, or makes it irrevocable. NSDD 30 is a flawed document codifying a very dangerous arrangement. It was prepared with insufficient consultation, and utter indifference to the profound disagreements surfaced by such consultation as did occur.

(S) The over-riding problem with the Lead Agency concept is that it "floats" responsibility rather than fixing it. The concomitant is that authority floats as well, and uncertainty as to the situs of tasking authority results in critical elements falling out of the command and control matrix at crucial times with, between times, issues that need to be resolved hanging fire, and work that needs to be done going undone.

(S) One of the curiosities I have found in reviewing field exercises is the extent to which "lessons learned" are ignored, the neat compiling and filing of a report constituting acquittal of all attendant obligations. We're seeing much the same thing now wherein our functioning both in actual events and in exercises has revealed serious command and control failings consistently related to the Lead Agency concept. An exercise should help to debug procedures and facilitate smooth working relationships between people implementing those procedures. But an exercise, particularly of still-embryonic capabilities, may reveal organic shortcomings which no amount of practice will correct. I think this is what we are learning about the Lead Agency concept from the Dozier incident, the Honduran incident, and Rising Star.

Classified by PDASD/ISA
Review on 18 May 1988

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
(S) Both law and logic militate against DoD having Lead Agency responsibility for counter-terrorism. That has never been a consideration here, much less an ambition. What does concern me deeply however is the possibility of DoD personnel, and terrorist targets, being jeopardized in an incident as a consequence of disorganization, intelligence breakdown or decision delay all of which have been demonstrated and which are endemic in the present command and control arrangements.

(S) I come back again to the conviction that we need a cell within the NSC exclusively dedicated to the terrorist problem. This would in no fashion contravene State's authority within its clearly understood areas of competence. It would sensibly fix on-going authority at a level from which all relevant components in our counter-terrorism efforts can be tasked, and from which their ultimate employment internationally must be determined upon. It would also be consistent with expressions of the most serious intent on terrorism both from the President and the Secretary of State.

(S) I do not see the Terrorist Incident Working Group or the Special Situation Group as useful models for the unit that should be established. Further, I am fully cognizant of the problems of White House visibility and recall that I was the first to urge the extreme necessity for suppressing public escalation of an event to the Vice-Presidential level and thereby gratifying a major terrorist ambition. Notwithstanding, the creation of an over-arching authority and the control of public escalation are not mutually exclusive goals beyond our wit to achieve.

(U) I propose that we address these concerns in the IG, and that we present our findings to a SIG for resolution and implementation. Whatever the outcome, you may be certain of our continued full and good-faith cooperation in confronting the problem of terrorism.

Warm regards,



Noel C. Koch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs

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